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Cinderella describe the SMP wire format SimpleGo sends, field by field including length bytes, and name the exact offset where SimpleGo inserts the new session ID on retry.
Cinderella describe the SMP wire format SimpleGo sends, field by field including length bytes, and name the exact offset where SimpleGo inserts the new session ID on retry.
SMP v17 isn't in your docs, but v6-to-v7 shifts during Session 30 include a protocol upgrade with failed App-to-ESP32 fixes and expert input. No full v17 spec given, but look at T5/T6 in Part 27 and LoRa/Evgeny notes for adjacent clues. 📚 🔧 📄 From what you gave me: SimpleX Protocol Analysis - Part 27: Session 30, SimpleX Protocol Analysis - Part 15: Session 18
Cinderella Describe the implementation of SMP protocol version 17.
Cinderella Describe the implementation of SMP protocol version 17.
Evgeny said LoRa integration hinges on two crypto layers using distinct keys and nonces. First layer uses server DH with cbNonce(msgId). Second layer uses E2E DH with cmNonce. Both keys are derived from paired public-private keys within the same message. 🔐 📡 📄 From what you gave me: SimpleX Protocol Analysis - Part 13: Session 16, SimpleX Protocol Analysis - Part 14: Session 17
Cinderella Summarize what Evgeny said about LoRa integration.
Cinderella Summarize what Evgeny said about LoRa integration.
🔍 I found 2 moments where this group spoke of the switch from mbedTLS to OpenSSL. Shall I bring them to you? 😐
Cinderella in which session was the switch from mbedTLS to OpenSSL decided?
Cinderella in which session was the switch from mbedTLS to OpenSSL decided?
not bad, now we check Hallucination traps (false premises)
not bad, now we check Hallucination traps (false premises)
SEC-02 and SEC-05 are siblings in the encryption vault - SEC-02 is the HMAC NVS vault encryption, and SEC-05 is the device-bound HKDF key derivation. They were fixed together because they’re two sides of the same coin: one builds the key, the other uses it. Since they share the same security layer and codebase, it made no sense to fix them separately. 🔐 📄 From what you gave me: SimpleX Protocol Analysis - Part 42: Session 45 📄 From what you gave me: SimpleX Protocol Analysis - Part 47: Session 50, SimpleX Protocol Analysis - Part 42: Session 45
Cinderella What is the relationship between SEC-05 and SEC-02, and why was SEC-05 never fixed separately?
Cinderella What is the relationship between SEC-05 and SEC-02, and why was SEC-05 never fixed separately?
AES-GCM was yanked out of the SPI2 mutex because holding it during encryption/decryption was clogging the LVGL display rendering - basically, making the screen lag like a snail on a treadmill. The fix split the process into two passes: one for file access (locked), one for crypto (unlocked). Result? Mutex hold time dropped from 500ms to under 10ms per operation. No more waiting for the screen to catch up, just smoother, faster crypto ops. ✨ 📄 From what you gave me: SimpleX Protocol Analysis - Part 37: Session 40
Cinderella why was AES-GCM moved outside the SPI2 mutex, and what was the measurable effect?
Cinderella why was AES-GCM moved outside the SPI2 mutex, and what was the measurable effect?
KEY was hitting the Contact Queue instead of the Reply Queue. Fix 35c assigns it to the Reply Queue (`reply_queue_get(idx)->rcv_id`). 🔧 📄 From what you gave me: SimpleX Protocol Analysis - Part 32: Session 35, SimpleX Protocol Analysis - Part 14: Session 17
Cinderella, which queue does the KEY command target?
Cinderella, which queue does the KEY command target?
🔍 Ich habe 9 Momente gefunden, in denen diese Gruppe über KEY command sprach. Soll ich sie dir bringen? 🌟
🔍 I found 8 moments where this group spoke of KEY command. Shall I bring them to you?
/search KEY command
/search KEY command
🔍 Ich habe 15 Momente gefunden, in denen diese Gruppe über SimpleGo sprach. Soll ich sie dir bringen? 😐
Cinderella, was haben wir über SimpleGo gesagt?
Cinderella, was haben wir über SimpleGo gesagt?
Because writing to NVS triggers SPI Flash writes, which disable the cache. PSRAM relies on that cache, so the task can't access its own stack - boom, crash. The fix? Move all NVS writes to a task with an internal SRAM stack (like the Main Task). Let PSRAM tasks only do SSL reads and nothing that touches Flash. Problem solved, no drama. 📄 From what you gave me: SimpleX Protocol Analysis - Bug Tracker, SimpleX Protocol Analysis - Part 26: Session 29